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Pension systems in EMEs: implications for  
capital flows and financial markets 
Ramon Moreno and Marjorie Santos
1 
Introduction and summary 
Pension systems can influence capital flows by affecting saving and investment. At the same 
time, the growth of pension fund assets has implications for the depth of financial markets. 
This paper seeks to shed light on these effects, by highlighting three relevant aspects. 
First, the stage in the demographic transition. Since around the mid-1960s, lower EME 
fertility rates have meant lower dependency ratios, which has tended to boost saving, and 
also a rise in the working-age population, which has tended to boost investment. The 
transition has worked out as predicted in some countries but not in others. In particular, in the 
aftermath of crises (eg Asia in the late 1990s), saving and investment have tended to fall, 
and current account balances to rise. Nevertheless, current account surpluses are expected 
to fall or turn to deficits as populations age in coming decades. In some countries, this 
process has already begun.  
Second, pension system design. National saving could be affected by how pension benefits 
are financed. Recent reforms have favoured plans based on defined contribution and 
prefunding, moving away from defined benefit and pay-as-you-go plans. However, with a few 
exceptions, it is not clear that such pension system reforms have helped increase saving. 
This could be due to lower precautionary saving, transitional fiscal costs associated with 
pension reforms, problems with low or declining pension fund coverage, and high costs. 
Third, pension fund asset accumulation and financial deepening. Rapid growth in pension 
fund assets appears to be associated with deeper financial markets in a number of EMEs. 
This could also influence capital flows by affecting saving and current account balances, as 
well as the pattern of gross capital flows. 
Stages in the demographic transition 
The demographic transition in EMEs over the past 40 years may be described as follows. In 
a first stage, which began around the mid-1960s, declining fertility rates
2 resulted in an 
increase in the working-age population and a decline in the share of the dependent young, 
                                                  
1   Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the BIS. The authors thank, without implicating, Már Gudmundsson, Philip 
Turner and William White for valuable comments. Contributions by Pablo García-Luna and Jimmy Shek to this 
paper are also gratefully acknowledged. 
2    Lee (2003) Figure 2, observes that fertility rates in developing countries began to fall in the 1960s. This 
reflects factors that raise the opportunity costs of bearing children. Such factors include increased productivity 
of labour, which raises the value of time for parents, increased investment in children because of higher 
incomes and higher returns on education (due to longer life spans and greater demand for more skilled 
workers) and higher rates of urbanisation. Certain developments reduce the value of children, such as 
government provision of a safety net or the availability of pensions. 46  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
with only a gradual increase in the share of the elderly population (Table 1).
3 The result has 
been declines in overall dependency ratios (the ratio of dependent young plus elderly to the 
working-age population) from around the mid-1960s to the present. (Annex Graph A1). 
However, this stage of the demographic transition is over or will end in the next couple of 
decades in some EMEs. Many countries are entering a second stage in which child 
dependency ratios are falling more gradually or have stabilised while elderly dependency 
ratios are rising more steeply (three right-hand columns in Table 1). As a result, projections 
up to 2050 indicate that overall dependency ratios will generally tend to rise. The implications 
of these trends for rates of investment and saving are discussed below. 
 
Table 1 
Changes in population shares
1 
In percentage points 














China 6.6  –6.1  –0.5  –20.6  15.0 5.5  –4.3  –14.3  18.6 
India   4.0  –3.9  –0.1  –10.8 8.1  2.7  –12.5 0.2  12.3 
Other Asia



















7   0.9  –2.6  1.8  –14.6  7.2 7.5  –0.5  –15.1  15.6 
Other EMEs
8   2.9  –3.1  0.2  –13.8  12.1 1.8  –9.4  –2.7  12.1 



































Aggregates are weighted averages based on total population data for 2000. 
1  Population in each age group as a share of total population.    
2  Population aged 14 or less.    
3  Population 
aged 15–59.    
4  Population aged 60 and above.    
5  Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand.    
6  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
7  The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.    
8  Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.    
9  France, Germany, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects. 
 
                                                  
3   The population forecasts are taken from the United Nations World Population Prospects, the most widely used 
source for population forecasts. The forecasts assume medium fertility. BIS Papers No 44  47
 
 
Implications for saving, investment and capital flows 
To see how the demographic transition would affect capital flows, it is worth recalling that a 
country’s net capital flows, or net financing requirements, depend on the current account 
balance  t CAB , which in turn reflects the behaviour of saving ( t Sav ) and investment ( t Inv ). 
That is
4 
t t t Inv Sav CAB − =  (1) 
The implications of demographic changes for saving and investment would depend on the 
stage in the demographic transition. When populations are relatively young, increases in the 
labour force would tend to raise the marginal product of capital, supporting higher rates of 
investment spending. At the same time, the falling overall dependency ratios resulting from 
lower fertility and child dependency would allow households to increase their rates of saving. 
(This is sometimes described in the literature as the first demographic dividend.)
5 
Conversely, when populations are relatively old, the declining labour force would tend to 
lower rates of investment while the increases in overall dependency associated with ageing 
populations would tend to lower saving.  
To shed some light on these demographic effects, Table 2 summarises trends in saving and 
investment over the past quarter century, with more details in Annex Graph A2.  
Table 2 covers the period 1981–2006, for which data on saving and investment in EMEs are 
more readily available. As working-age populations tended to increase during this period, 
investment would have been expected to rise. At the same time, declining overall 
dependency ratios would tend to increase saving rates. However, Table 2 gives a much 
more mixed impression. In line with expectations, both saving and investment in China and 
India increased sharply over the period as overall dependency ratios fell, while declining in 
Japan where (reflecting a rapidly ageing population) dependency ratios have risen for some 
time now. However, contrary to expectations, increases in saving in the remaining EMEs 
have generally been modest, and investment ratios have generally declined. One reason is 
the effect of crises which appear to have persistent effects in dampening national saving and 
investment. In particular, the Asian crisis of 1997–98 obscures the very large increases in 
investment and saving that occurred in the region until 1996 (see footnote 3 in Table 2). 
Indeed, Bloom and Williamson (1998) find that increases in investment and saving rates 
(with the former exceeding the latter) were apparent in East Asia up to the first half of the 
1990s as overall dependency ratios fell (Annex Graph A2). They conclude that the increase 
in working-age relative to dependent population contributed to East Asia’s so-called 
economic miracle. The effects of earlier crises also appear to have dampened saving and 
investment growth in Latin America. In the case of the United States, the sharp decline in 
saving appears in part to reflect perceived increases in wealth associated with rising asset 
prices, and the emergence of a financing technology (home equity financing) that increased 
the liquidity of the wealth held by households.  
                                                  
4   In this paper, current account and investment data are used to estimate national saving. 
5   The ultimate effects on national saving would depend on a variety of other factors. For example, the growth in 
output associated with higher investment and embedded total factor productivity growth could further increase 
household saving, corporate and government saving. However, household saving would tend to fall at higher 
levels of wealth. In line with this, empirical studies find that growth is associated with higher household saving, 
but higher real per capita income is associated lower household saving. (see eg Loayza et al (2000) and Bulíř 




Saving, investment and current account
1 
Change from 1980–2006 (pct pt)
2  Level in 2006 (per cent)   
Saving Investment Current 
account  Saving Investment Current 
account 
China  19.5 10.1  9.4 54.1 44.6  9.4 
India    15.0 14.8  0.2 33.8 34.9 –1.1 
Other Asia
3  3.5 –5.3  8.8 30.8 25.6  5.2 
Latin America
4   0.9 –4.1  5.0 21.9 20.1  1.8 
CEE
5    2.2 –2.6  4.8 25.9 21.1  4.8 
Other EMEs
6    –11.4 –2.5 –9.0 25.8 21.2  4.7 
Memo:        
United States    –7.0 –0.7 –6.2 13.9 20.0 –6.2 
Japan    –3.8 –8.7  4.9 28.0 24.1  3.9 
Western 
Europe
7   –1.8 –3.8  2.0 20.3 19.0  1.3 
1  As a percentage of GDP.    
2  For CEE, change from 1992–2006.    
 3  Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. For this group, saving and investment increased by about 
7  percentage points from 1980–96.   
4    Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
5  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.    
6  Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.    
7  France, 
Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
 
The ambiguity of the results in Table 2 highlights the extent to which factors other than 
demographics can play an important role in influencing national saving and investment.  
As for current accounts, there appears to have been an extended cycle in which a number of 
EMEs started with current account deficits but more recently – often in the aftermath of crises 
– have experienced current account surpluses.
6 Demographics would predict that over time, 
EME current account surpluses would turn to deficits again. For example, a recent study 
(IMF (2004)) covering 115  countries found that investment tended to exceed saving on 
average over the sample period. However, a rise in the share of the working-age population 
tended to increase the saving to GDP ratio more than it increased the investment ratio (by 
0.72 and 0.31 respectively).
7 A rise in the share of the elderly population tended to reduce 
the saving ratio more than it reduced the investment ratio (by –0.35 and –0.14 respectively). 
This implies that the current account balance would tend to rise with a larger share of the 
working-age population, and fall in response to ageing in the population.
8 
                                                  
6   In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, these surpluses reflected declines in investment that exceeded declines in 
national saving. See Moreno (2007). 
7   IMF (2004), Table 3.1, page 143, estimates that in a panel of 115 countries over the period 1960–2000 a rise 
in the share of the working-age population was associated with an increase in real GDP per capita, while a 
rise in the share of the elderly population was associated with a decline. 
8   Additional perspective is provided by a study by Bulíř and Swiston (2006), Table 2, who estimate the effects of 
changes in overall dependency ratios on private saving in a cross-section analysis of 44 developed and 
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Looking ahead, a question of interest is to what extent ageing is already affecting saving and 
investment or might do so in the near future. Table 1 (three right-hand columns) indicates 
that particularly sharp declines in the shares of working-age population and increases in the 
shares of the elderly are projected for CEE and China. The declines in shares of working-age 
population and increases in elderly population are roughly comparable to those already 
observed in Japan. In CEE and China, and some other countries, the projected rise in elderly 
dependency is comparatively steep (Annex Graph A1).  
This implies that saving and investment might be expected to fall and current accounts tend 
to deficit in CEE and China sooner than in other countries. However, as discussed earlier, 
there is considerable uncertainty about the timing of these effects because of the influence of 
other factors on saving and investment. For example, Singapore’s population has been 
ageing for some time now, and elderly and overall dependency ratios are projected to rise 
more steeply than in other countries (Annex Graphs A1 and A2). However, while saving and 
investment ratios have fallen, Singapore’s saving remains well above the average for EMEs, 
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Saving/GDP (y-axis)1 Investment/GDP (y-axis)1 Current account/GDP (y-axis)1
Years to trough in overall dependency2
AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; HK = Hong Kong SAR; HU = Hungary; 
ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; 
SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore (not included in the regression, but the data points are shown in the graph); TH = Thailand; 
TR = Turkey; VE = Venezuela; ZA = South Africa.
1 Average of 2002–06.    2 Where 2006 = year 0. Overall dependency ratio is defined as the population less than 15 years of age plus 
population 60 years or older divided by the population of 15–59 year-olds. 
Sources: IMF; United Nations.
In per cent
Saving, investment, current account and years to trough in dependency ratios
 
Additional perspective can be gained from Graph 1, which relates saving, investment and 
current account balances to the years to trough in overall dependency in a small cross-
section of EMEs. In each graph, countries on the right side of the x-axis are younger, 
implying higher overall dependency ratios (because of high child dependency). Moving left 
                                                                                                                                                      
emerging market economies. They find that in this decade, a 1 point increase in the overall dependency ratio 
is associated with a 0.3 percentage point decline in the ratio of private saving to GDP. The association is 
higher (0.63) in industrial countries, and has risen compared to the 1990s (see also Loayza et al (2000)). 
Furthermore, Asian economies are found to save more than is predicted in the model, and until the end of the 
1990s, Latin American countries tended to save less than predicted. These regressions explain between two 
thirds and three fourths of the cross-country variance of the private saving rate. 50  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
on the x-axis towards zero, overall dependency ratios are low (reflecting higher working-age 
populations and lower child dependency ratios). Dependency ratios then rise again in 
response to a rising share of elderly population and lower share of working-age populations. 
Focusing first on saving (left-hand panel), we would expect a non-linear relationship in which 
saving is low in countries where the population is young (right side of the axis), tends to rise 
towards the middle of the graph and then declines when approaching the zero point of the 
x-axis or past it. A quadratic regression line broadly reveals such a relationship in saving and 
in the current account. (The regression line for investment turns out to be linear.) Again, 
caution is needed in interpreting these results because of wide dispersion in the data. In 
particular, Singapore is a significant outlier with an older population and very high rates of 
saving.
9 
Pension system design 
A key challenge faced by pension authorities is to generate enough resources to meet 
pension liabilities given a desired level of coverage and replacement income while 
minimising the burden on the working-age population. In this connection, there has been 
much discussion of how to fund pension benefits, and specifically on the extent to which 
countries should rely on income transfers or (alternatively) accumulated assets to finance 
retirement spending. National practices appear to vary considerably. Drawing on research by 
the National Transfers Account project, Lee and Mason (2007) estimate that reliance on 
assets has been comparatively high in Thailand and the United States, and comparatively 














United States (2000) Japan (1999) Thailand (1998) Taiwan, China (1998)
Public transfers  
Familial transfers
Work                         
Asset-based (income or sales)
1 As a percentage of total consumption. 
Source: Lee and Mason (2007).
Financing of old-age consumption1
 
                                                  
9   Singapore is such an outlier that it was not included in the regression analysis. However, all other countries 
shown in the graph were included in the regression. 
10   At the same time, however, there appears to be significant reliance on familial transfers in Thailand and 
Taiwan. 
11   We thank Ronald Lee for permission to use this graph. BIS Papers No 44  51
 
 
Some of these differences could reflect different institutional arrangements for financing 
old-age consumption, including differences in pension design and coverage. Traditionally. 
pension systems have relied on defined benefit (ie guaranteed incomes) pay-as-you-go 
systems, in which taxes on workers fund the pension incomes of the elderly. However, these 
systems tended to create very large implicit pension debts that, since they were not fully 
funded, raised concerns about the adequacy of replacement incomes and potential fiscal 
burdens. In particular, unfunded systems in which payments have to be implemented via 
transfers from the working-age population (eg traditional pay-as-you-go systems) raised 
concerns about increasing burdens on a declining pool of workers. Projected declines in the 
share of workers and increases in the share of elderly dependents in the population (Table 1, 
three right-hand columns) imply increases in elderly and overall dependency ratios. The 
issue is of particular interest in countries where populations are ageing more rapidly 
(eg CEE, Korea and China).  
The potential financing problems that can arise in more traditional pension systems are 
illustrated by the experience of Korea, where the pension system is a partially funded defined 
benefit system managed by the government.
12 Holzmann et al (2004) note that reserves 
accumulated through the public pension system were low compared to the estimated implicit 
pension debt (IPD), respectively 10% and 47% of GDP, 10 years after the scheme was 
introduced. It was estimated that the fund would be completely exhausted within the first half 
of the 21st century.
13 One difficulty is that payment promises in a defined benefit plan do not 
depend on a pension system’s performance or ability to accumulate assets. Another difficulty 
pertains to incentives to save under these arrangements discussed below. 
Recent pension legislation (eg in Latin America) has instead sought to encourage wealth 
accumulation via personal saving to fund retirement consumption. In particular, there has 
been more emphasis on defined contribution, rather than defined benefit, which reduces the 
implicit pension debt. For example, Chile’s pension system (introduced in 1981) is a fully 
funded defined contribution system of mandatory individual accounts managed by private 
pension fund administrators (AFPs). In the 1990s, eight emerging market economies 
implemented pension reforms similar to Chile’s.
14  
In assessing the extent to which pension reforms of this latter type could reduce the burden 
on the working-age population, it is worth noting that in a closed economy, consumption by 
the old would always involve some transfer of resources away from the young. In a 
pay-as-you-go system, the transfer would involve the payment of taxes (eg for social 
security, as in the United States). In a fully funded system with private accounts (eg as in 
Latin America) the transfer would involve the payment of rent, interest income or dividends 
to, or purchases of assets from, retirees. Nevertheless, a fully funded defined contribution 
system can still reduce the burden on the working-age population if over time it increases 
saving and the stock of capital of the economy. Higher capital/labour ratios would raise 
worker productivity, making it easier to sustain any given level of elderly consumption out of 
current income. In an open economy, burdens on the working-age population could also be 
reduced via the accumulation of foreign assets, which can result from additional saving, or 
                                                  
12   However, in 2007, the National Pension Service (NPS) mandated several investment banks (Morgan Stanley, 
Credit Suisse) to manage part of its assets. See Song Jung-a, “S Korea turns to global banks on pensions”, 
Financial Times, 25 July 2007. 
13  The precise estimated dates vary (by 2031 according to Moon (2002) and 2047 according to the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (Bateman (2007)). 
14   These are Peru (1993), Argentina and Colombia (1994), Uruguay (1995), Mexico and Bolivia (1997), 
El Salvador (1998) and Poland (1999). In contrast, Brazil has not adopted individual accounts and recently 
introduced a notional defined contribution system, which links contributions to benefits, but the contributions 
are not placed in individually funded accounts (Matijascic and Kay (2008)).  52  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
the diversification of pension fund portfolios (see below). This would reduce claims on 
domestically produced goods and services at the time of retirement (compared to the case of 
pay-as-you-go financing or domestic investment only).  
Reformed pension systems could increase the incentive to save and reduce evasion 
because pension contributions are not transfers to others but are savings explicitly accruing 
to the individual.
15 However, the impact on saving rates of pension reforms similar to those 
adopted in Chile does not appear to be large.
16 Saving ratios in countries listed earlier as 
having adopted these reforms have generally not increased markedly over time (Annex 
Graph A2). In Poland, for example, sharp increases in saving rates pre-date the 1999 
pension reforms, and national saving rates have by and large drifted downwards since the 
reforms were adopted. In Latin America, saving rates are still comparatively low, and 
increases in some cases have only offset earlier declines.
17 An exception is Chile, where 
national saving rates have risen since the adoption of pension reforms in the 1980s.  
Several factors may have limited the impact of pension reforms on national saving. 
•  Lack of financial literacy. Pension reforms will not increase saving if contributors are 
not aware of the possible returns from saving. Some recent survey data from Chile 
suggests that many pension contributors (up to around 60%) probably lack such 
awareness as they cannot provide estimates of the balances on their pension 
accounts. It also appears that contributors with lower awareness have smaller 
balances (Arenas de Mesa et al (2008)).  
•  Reduced precautionary saving. Precautionary household saving outside the pension 
system may have been reduced to the extent to which fully funded defined 
contribution plans are seen as more credible than defined benefit plans that are not 
fully funded. This effect may be accentuated if pension funds also contribute to 
financial deepening (see below). The impact on overall saving would then be small 
and could even be negative. In a number of countries, there has also been a decline 
in private saving offsetting increases in government saving. Indeed, Bulíř and 
Swiston (2006) find that the private saving offset to public saving has increased 
considerably in this decade; a 1 point rise in the ratio of public saving to GDP is 
offset by a 0.9 point decline in private saving (up from 0.4 to 0.6 in the 1990s). This 
may reflect lower precautionary saving, due not only to pension reforms but also to 
more credible macroeconomic policies. 
•  Transitional costs. While pension reforms have increased assets to cover implicit 
pension debts, explicit recognition of such debts has resulted in larger fiscal deficits 
over a relatively extended transition period. Roldos (2007) notes that “the loss of 
contributions to individual accounts and the payment of recognition bonds to those 
who moved to the new partially or fully funded systems added in some cases more 
than 10 percentage points of GDP to public debt ratios”. It may also be noted that in 
some cases, such as Peru, reforms were implemented in such a way that workers 
                                                  
15  Indeed, in Korea, the contributions tend to be low due to a relatively large self-employed sector, where plan 
participants tend to underreport their income. A less developed infrastructure for enforcement and collection 
also plays a role. Reforms adopted in 2007 seek to improve the sustainability of the system by gradually 
reducing the income replacement rate from 60% to 50% in 2008 and then to 40% by 2028. 
16   The same could be said for current accounts. In Graph 1, the largest surpluses appear to be in countries that 
are export-oriented (ie Singapore and Malaysia) or are commodity exporters (eg Venezuela). The extent to 
which mandatory contributions to provident funds might help explain the large current account surpluses in 
Singapore and Malaysia remains to be determined. 
17  OECD (2007) reaches a similar conclusion. It also notes that empirical work on the impact of pension reforms 
on national saving is not conclusive.  BIS Papers No 44  53
 
 
had an incentive to stay with the traditional pay-as-you-go system, although this was 
later modified (Carranza and Morón (2008)). 
•  Declining pension coverage of workers. OECD (2007, Box 2.1, pp 69–70) estimates 
that the weighted average of coverage for the Latin American region fell from 63% 
before the pension reforms to 26% in 2006 (however, the initial coverage could be 
an overestimate). In particular, while membership in pension funds has increased as 
a proportion of the registered workforce, the share of members who actually 
contribute has fallen in every country.
18 Research is needed to uncover the reasons, 
but an important factor appears to be whether a pension plan is mandatory, or the 
default is set to automatic enrolment (Beshears et al (2008)). Given that pension 
plan contributions are mandatory in a number of EMEs, a large informal sector may 
also play a role. High administrative costs of pension systems (see next item) may 
also be partly responsible.
19  
•  High administrative costs. Reforms that have forced workers to channel savings to 
fund their own retirement through private financial institutions have resulted in high 
fees.
20 Costs in these systems average 1% to 2% in the long run, which can have 
the effect of lowering future pensions 20–30%. Against this it has been argued that 
that high operating costs largely reflect marketing expenditures in retail-oriented 
pension fund systems and institutional reforms could reduce them (James, et al 
(2001)). It is also argued that government-run pension systems deliver much lower 
returns than private systems.
21 
Asset accumulation and financial deepening 
Pension funds: asset growth and composition 
Experience suggests that pension funds can contribute to financial sector deepening. As 
pension fund assets grow, they can help diversify the investor base and provide stable 
demand for fixed income securities as well as for new financial instruments (eg high-yield 
bonds, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and foreign exchange and interest rate 
derivatives). The process is potentially symbiotic, as this in turn supports pension fund 
growth by increasing the availability of longer-maturity assets for pension fund investments.  
Since 2000, pension fund assets have grown rapidly in a number of EMEs. As shown in Graph 
3, as a percentage of GDP these assets have risen by more than 8 percentage points in Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Poland. (In contrast, partly reflecting their initially greater size, pension 
fund assets have grown only moderately in Singapore and declined in Malaysia over the same 
period.) However, there is still ample scope for further growth, as pension fund assets are 
generally still small in EMEs. In 2006, eight out of 13 EMEs shown in Graph 7 had assets of 
less than 20% of GDP. Among EMEs, only in Chile, Singapore and Malaysia did pension fund 
assets exceed 50% of GDP. Although this is comparable in size to some developed 
economies, it is still small compared to the 100% of GDP recorded in the United States.  
                                                  
18  The percentage of registered workers who contribute ranges from 11% in Peru to 31% in Mexico and 58% in 
Chile. 
19  In line with some of these developments, the success of recent (three-pillar) pension systems in achieving 
their social goals is being questioned, notably in Chile (Kay and Sinha (2008)). Efforts to address this could 
have effects on saving and investment as well.  
20  For a more severe critique, see Kotlikoff (2006).  
















SG CL MY KR BR PE CO HU AR PL MX CZ CN US GB JP
2000  
20061
AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; GB = United Kingdom; HU = Hungary; 
JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PL = Poland; SG = Singapore; US = United States.    
1 Or latest available.    
Sources: OECD; Association of Pension Fund Administrators; national data.
Pension fund assets (as a percentage of GDP)
 
Composition of pension fund portfolios 
The impact of pension fund accumulation on the domestic financial sector depends in part on 
the composition of pension fund portfolios. The following aspects may be highlighted. 
First, the share of assets held in financial institutions has tended to decline in a number of 
EMEs (see Chan et al (2006) for Latin America). This may reflect less reliance on bank 
deposits as investments, which could enhance demand for other financial instruments and 
financial deepening. However, in some countries, bank deposits remain significant. 
According to OECD statistics, in 2005 the share of cash and deposits in total pension fund 
assets in Thailand, Brazil and Indonesia was 40%, 44% and 71% respectively. 
Second, the portfolio composition of pension fund assets in some EMEs, Latin America in 
particular, is highly weighted towards government bonds. Indeed, as reported by Chan et al 
(2006), in the majority of Latin American countries they sampled pension funds held more 
than half of their portfolios in government debt (in Mexico and El Salvador it was more than 
four fifths). Of particular interest is that in five Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
El  Salvador, Peru and Uruguay) pension fund assets became more concentrated in 
government debt between 1999 and 2005. By way of comparison, the share of pension fund 
assets invested in bonds (both public and private) in the United States and Japan tended to 
fall (between 1995 and 2005, from 26% to 19% and from 46% to 30%, respectively; see 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2007)). 
Third, some pension funds (eg Korea or Mexico, Table 3) tend to allocate a relatively small 
amount of their portfolios to equities, even if relatively young populations (eg in India) 
suggest that there is scope for increasing allocation to equities.
22 By way of comparison, in 
the United States, 41% and 24% of pension fund assets are invested in equities and mutual 
funds, respectively.  
                                                  
22  Some research suggests that it would be optimal to have portfolios that are more heavily skewed towards 




Restrictions on portfolio composition and actual asset composition 
% of total assets (2006 or 2007) 
Domestic equities  Foreign assets   
Maximum limits  Actual 
composition  Maximum limits  Actual 
composition 
India       
Korea 12  11  20  9 
Singapore PPR  0  PPR … 
Argentina 50 13 20  10 
Chile 39  17  30  32 
Colombia 30 15 20  14 
Mexico 15  0.4  20  8 
Peru 35  42  10.5  8 
Hungary 50 8  30  5 
Poland 40  32  5  2 
Memo:          
United States  PPR  41  PPR   
United Kingdom  PPR  40  PPR   
Japan 30    30   
PPR = “prudent person rule”. 
Sources: Poirson (2007); OECD, Global Pension Statistics; OECD, Latin American Economic Outlook, 2008; 
Korea National Pension Service.  
 
Fourth, with some exceptions (eg Chile), the allocation to foreign assets by EME pension 
funds also tends to be small.  
The lack of diversification in pension fund portfolios is in a number of cases the result of 
restrictions on pension fund investments in equities and foreign assets (Table 3). A major 
reason for these restrictions is that expanding pension fund portfolios to include assets with 
returns exhibiting very high volatility (domestic equities and foreign assets) is believed to 
create an unacceptable risk of losses that could impoverish pension fund participants.  
There are two arguments for liberalising restrictions on pension fund investments, both of 
which have to do with the gains from diversification. First, liberalisation can reduce 
concentration in a portfolio and consequently lower the risk of very large losses. This can be 
particularly important in emerging market economies which, in the past, have been 
vulnerable to sharp downturns or even financial crises. For example, a pension fund 
investing in domestic bank deposits avoids market and liquidity risk but retains counterparty 
risk to the domestic banking system. This risk can be reduced (at the cost of assuming some 
exchange rate risk) by adding foreign assets to its portfolio.  
Second, liberalisation increases the set of investable instruments and potential gains from 
diversification. The recent performance of a variety of financial instruments suggests that 
these gains can be very large. For example, in this decade domestic Latin American 
government securities (GBI-Latin America) earned a shade over 10% annualised return 56  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
(in US dollars) with an annualised volatility of 10% (Graph 4). However, roughly triple those 
returns could have been earned by investing in Latin American equities, at the cost of more 
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The line represents the efficient portfolio frontier. EM = Emerging Markets; EMBI = Emerging Markets Bond Index; GBI = Government 
Bond Index; MSCI = Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
1 Unhedged returns in US dollars; in per cent.    2 Standard deviation of returns, calculated using daily percentage changes in the return 
index.
Sources: JPMorgan Chase; Merrill Lynch; Datastream.
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Returns can be improved not only by diversifying into equities (at home or abroad), but also 
by diversifying into foreign bonds. For example, adding domestic bonds from other regions to 
an investment portfolio could be associated with increased returns with less than proportional 
increases in volatility; indeed, the GBI-EM index has higher returns and lower volatility than 
the GBI-Latin America index. This reflects diversification benefits resulting from combining 
assets in a portfolio whose returns have low or negative correlations (see below).  
Berstein and Chumacero (2005) provide more precise estimates of the gains from easing 
specific restrictions on pension fund asset allocations in Chile. Their analysis suggests that 
by mid-2002, in the absence of the specific pension fund restrictions applied in Chile, 
pension fund assets could have been higher by between 10% (for a quadratic preference or 
an efficient value-at-risk portfolio) and 30% (for a minimum variance portfolio) without 
increasing the volatility of returns (see their Figure 3). Put differently, for a minimum variance 
portfolio, with the same volatility of returns, returns to the unrestricted portfolio averaged 
0.85% a month, compared to 0.67% per month for the restricted portfolio.
23 This is because 
                                                  
23  The authors estimate the restricted portfolio by (where applicable) calibrating parameters in the objective 
function so as to replicate the ex post pension fund portfolio returns and volatilities. The unrestricted portfolio 
is selected so that in each period it is exposed to the same volatility as the restricted portfolio. The return 
corresponding to that volatility is then estimated. These results vary somewhat with differing assumptions 
about transaction costs, but the basic conclusions hold; see Berstein and Chumacero (2005), Table 3. BIS Papers No 44  57
 
 
the unrestricted optimal portfolio implied a larger allocation to foreign bonds and equities 
(about a ⅓ share for the minimum variance model) than would have been the case for the 
restricted portfolio. Thus, for the minimum variance model, the probability of hitting the 
investment limit for foreign fixed income and equity instruments was estimated at about 62% 
and 90%, respectively. 
How much would pension funds invest abroad? 
While steps are being taken to liberalise pension fund investments abroad in a number of 
EMEs, it is not clear how much pension funds will increase their investments abroad in 
response. On the one hand, in the case of Chile, or other EMEs, the returns from moving to 
an optimum share of foreign assets (and corresponding gross outflows channelled via 
pension funds) could be even higher than suggested by Berstein and Chumacero’s (2005) 
estimates. In their analysis, they only consider developed country fixed and variable income 
instruments as alternatives to domestic assets,
24 while recent experience suggests that EME 
pension funds could earn even higher-risk adjusted returns by investing in assets issued in 
other EMEs. As can be seen in Graph 4, a number of regional (EMBI, GBI and MSCI) indices 
dominate their developed country counterparts in terms of risk-adjusted returns. Against 
these advantages is the possibility that EMEs might be more vulnerable to crises, so that a 
pension fund that is very concerned about the risk of large losses might be less inclined to 
invest in EME instruments.  
Much depends on the diversification benefits provided by EME instruments on average and 
during episodes of financial stress. As can be seen in Graph 5, equities are not fully 
correlated across regions over a longer period (2001–07). This highlights the opportunities 
for diversification benefits from EME pension fund investments in both developed market and 
other emerging market equities. However, an important concern is that correlations in 
cross-country equity returns tend to rise during episodes of financial stress. Nevertheless, 
EM pension funds may be in a better position to manage the risks of diversification (than, 
say, EM banks) because pension fund liabilities tend to be longer-term. Also, bond 
investments do not appear to raise such concerns, as correlations in some cases have 
actually fallen during episodes of financial stress. 
On the other hand, diversification could be limited by a number of factors.
25 Even in the 
absence of restrictions, there is evidence that investors prefer to invest in their own domestic 
markets (home bias). This is reflected in the fact that pension fund investment abroad is 
below the ceiling in a number of countries (Table 3).
26 An important reason is that developing 
monitoring and management capacity to invest abroad is costly, particularly for pension 
funds in EMEs having little experience with investments in global financial markets. For 
example, as pension fund liabilities are denominated in domestic currency pension funds 
                                                  
24   They assume that there are four types of assets: domestic fixed, domestic variable, foreign fixed and foreign 
variable income (as proxied for, respectively, by promissory notes of the Central Bank of Chile of eight-year 
maturity, an index of all Chilean variable return instruments, an index based on all US indices, and the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average). 
25   Limited diversification of pension portfolios has also been observed in countries with higher incomes per 
capita. Gudmundsson (2001) describes stages in which pension funds in Iceland first invested in domestic 
bonds, lending directly to members (for housing), and then increased the share of foreign assets and equity in 
their portfolios over a short period of time (from low single digits to 19–26% between the mid-1990s and 
2000), resulting in large increases in returns on assets. In part, this reflected liberalisation, but also awareness 
by pension fund managers of the need to increase returns. 
26   Actual limits could also turn out to be below the ceiling because the ceiling applies to each fund individually and 
there are significant penalties for breaching the ceiling (eg forced sales). Under those conditions, fund managers 
would want to stay well below the ceiling to avoid breaches because fluctuations in market prices and mark to 
market accounting can push restricted asset holdings above the ceiling without any trade taking place. 58  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
need to develop the capacity to manage currency risks;
27 There is also limited availability of 
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1 Calculated on daily unhedged returns in US dollars.    2 Period of increased global market volatility. 
Sources: Datastream; JPMorgan Chase.
Correlations in asset markets1
 
There is growing awareness of the need to provide such hedging instruments. For example, 
in India market participants are now allowed to use foreign exchange forwards, swaps and 
options. While this is usually only against “crystallised foreign currency exposures”, the range 
of hedging tools available is now to be expanded (Mohan (2007)). However, it is still not clear 
to what extent pension funds would engage in hedging even were the appropriate 
instruments to be made available, because hedging would be costly. An additional concern is 
whether pension funds could contribute to increased volatility of capital flows (Vargas and 
                                                  
27   With regard to monitoring investments abroad, pension funds could draw on the risk management capacity of 
global financial institutions by investing in vehicles such as mutual funds. 
28   See Moreno (2006), Table A6 and Mohan (2007).  BIS Papers No 44  59
 
 
Varela (2008)), which could reduce risk-adjusted returns or raise broader risk management 
concerns. 
Deeper financial markets 
As pension fund assets have grown, emerging securities markets have deepened in recent 
years. Domestic debt markets, which are largest in Asia, South Africa and Turkey, have 
generally grown in this decade. However, they have not grown in central Europe, (Graph 6 
and Annex Graph A3). There has also been a tendency for stock market capitalisation to rise 
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However, financial markets in EMEs are still not as deep as in developed countries. This is 
broadly reflected in (i) still low ratios of market capitalisation in securities to GDP; (ii) high 
ratios of bank deposits to GDP; (iii) lack of liquidity in securities markets; and (iv) low reliance 
on securities markets for financing. 
Low ratio of securities to GDP. As illustrated in Graph 6, the ratio of debt securities to GDP 
ranged from less than 30% for CEE to 60% or higher in Asia and Latin America. (Annex 
Graph A3 provides country details.) However, this ratio was around 200% in the United 
States and Japan (Annex Graph A4). With the recent run-up in EME equity prices, stock 
market capitalisation ratios are more comparable with the 100% and 150% observed in 
Japan and the United States respectively, although they remain at a comparatively low 50% 
in Latin America.  
Relatively high bank deposits. M2/GDP has recently averaged around 140% in Asian EMEs 
and 45–60% in other EMEs. Bank deposits are thus relatively more important in EMEs than 
in the US, where the M2/GDP ratio averaged 50%. However, M2/GDP ratios are about as 
high in Japan (nearly 150%) as they are in Asian EMEs.
29  
                                                  
29  One implication is that in countries where pension funds hold a significant proportion of bank assets, bank 
interest rate liberalisation could significantly increase pension fund returns, particularly where rising inflation is 
a concern. Bank interest rates have been liberalised in many EMEs, although restrictions are still relevant in 
certain countries, like China or India. See Mohanty and Turner ((2008), Tables A4 and A5) for information on 
the liberalisation of bank interest rates between 1997 and 2006. In some cases, pension funds could help 
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Low liquidity. The rate of turnover in financial instruments tends to be lower in EMEs than in 
developed markets. This can present problems for risk management (and eventual wealth 
accumulation), by making it difficult for investors to change their positions. As can be seen in 
Graph 7, debt trading volume as a percentage of GDP ranged from a low of around 10% of 
GDP in Asia to a high of around 150% in Latin America. By way of comparison, the 
corresponding ratios for Japan and the US were respectively about 500% and nearly 2000%. 
As for equity markets, turnover tends to be lower in Latin America (around 10% of GDP) and 
around 80% in Asia and “other”. By way of comparison, the corresponding turnover ratios for 
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Limited reliance on equities for financing. To illustrate, in China stock market capitalisation as 
a percentage of GDP is quite high (90%), but flow of funds data indicate that between 2003 
and 2005 equities accounted for only about 4% of total increases in liabilities, with bank 
loans and bond financing accounting for much larger shares (61% and 35% respectively). 
The reasons why higher share prices do not lead to more share issuance warrant further 
examination. 
Role of pension funds in financial deepening 
The developments highlighted above suggest that further pension fund development could 
contribute to the deepening of financial markets. One indication is that the correlation 
between financial deepening and pension fund growth is comparatively strong in a number of 
EMEs. As shown in Table 4, stock market capitalisation is positively correlated with pension 
                                                                                                                                                      
promote interest rate liberalisation. In the case of India, pension funds could help eliminate distortions in 
interest rates caused by existing arrangements to support small savers (Mohan (2007)). To compensate for 
the lack of a social security system, the government gives small savers access to saving instruments 
(administered through post offices and commercial banks) that benefit from tax incentives and favourable 
interest rates set by the government. However, to attract deposits, banks competing with these small saving 
schemes tend to set rates on long-term deposits at levels higher than those which would have been obtained 
under competitive market conditions. This has been seen as contributing to downward stickiness of lending 
rates (with implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy). Improvements in the social safety net 
(including pensions) could address this issue. (A proposed interim solution is to benchmark these 
administered interest rates to market determined rates.) BIS Papers No 44  61
 
 
fund asset growth in Korea, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Poland. In contrast, the 
correlation is negative in Malaysia and Singapore. As for domestic debt securities, the 
correlation is positive (in either levels or changes) in most EMEs listed. 
 
Table 4 








Ratio  Change in 
ratio  Ratio  Change in 
ratio 
China  2000  2006 0.27 0.04 0.81  –0.60 
Korea  1990  2006 0.76 0.41 0.92 0.40 
Malaysia  2000  2006 –0.38 –0.09 –0.28  0.65 
Singapore  2000  2006 –0.20  –0.65 0.82 0.61 
Argentina  1995  2006 0.48 0.34 0.94 0.85 
Brazil    na na na na 
Chile  1982  2006 0.68 0.79 0.30 0.71 
Colombia  1995  2006 0.72 0.38 0.98 0.74 
Mexico  1998  2006 0.39  –0.23 0.96 0.54 
Peru  1994  2006 0.72 0.44 0.90 0.20 
Czech  Republic    na na na na 
Hungary    na na na na 
Poland  2000  2006 0.86 0.33 0.96 0.91 
United  States 2001  2006 0.96 0.94 0.59 0.11 
Japan  2001  2006 0.98 0.86 0.64  –0.58 
1  Based on annual data covering the time period shown. 
Sources: OECD; FIAP; S&P Emerging Markets Database; national data; BIS. 
 
The results in Table 4 are broadly in line with Roldos (2007) and OECD (2007), who note 
that institutional investment (including by pension funds) has been associated with increases 
in market capitalisation of stocks and bonds. This relationship is particularly apparent in 
Chile. In line with this, the share of pension funds in government debt markets in a set of 
Latin American countries rose from 18% in 1998 to 29% in 2005 (Roldos (2007), Table 4). 
Pension fund demand is also believed to have helped stimulate the development of new 
financial instruments. There is also evidence of lengthening maturities in fixed income 
markets in Chile and Mexico, and institutional investors, including pension funds, are 
believed to have played an important role in this. Research also suggests that the growth of 
institutional investors such as pension funds can lower the cost of capital and encourage the 
creation of new financial instruments (Walker and Lefort (2002)). A pension fund portfolio 
reallocation to equities could thus boost investment and growth as well as returns for pension 62  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
fund investors. The importance of this effect would depend in part on the extent to which 
firms rely on equity for their financing (which as noted earlier, can be relatively little in some 
EMEs).
30 
Implications for saving and capital flows 
The implications of greater financial depth for capital flows are uncertain, but some research 
suggests it could affect capital flows by lowering precautionary saving and current account 
balances. A recent study by Chinn and Ito (2007) finds that a larger financial sector could 
lower current account balances under certain conditions.
31 This is an issue of interest in a 
number of EMEs, notably China.  
The effects of pension fund portfolio liberalisation on net or gross capital flows are also 
uncertain. However, the experience of Chile since 1998, reported by Desormeaux et al 
(2008) suggests that pension fund investments abroad can have a large impact on gross 
outflows. This impression is reinforced by evidence they cite that an increase of 10% in 
foreign investment limits on Chilean pension funds is associated with an accumulated 
depreciation of 2% of the Chilean peso against the US dollar (see Cowan et al (2008)). To 
illustrate orders of magnitude, at the limit of 30% that prevailed until recently, Chilean 
pension fund assets invested abroad would be equivalent to nearly 20% of Chilean GDP. 
Pending legislation contemplates significant easing of these limits which could mean large 
cumulative gross outflows over time in the pension fund sector. By way of comparison, 
foreign reserves to GDP in Latin America averaged about 10% in 2006 (13% in Chile) and 
35% in Asia.  
An issue of interest is whether outflows channelled via pension funds could help offset large 
gross capital inflows, thus reducing the incentives for foreign exchange market intervention 
and reserve accumulation in some countries. While they are not perfect substitutes for 
foreign reserves, pension fund accumulation of foreign assets could provide a channel for 
intermediating capital inflows abroad, thus providing some of the benefits that have been 
sought from foreign exchange market intervention and foreign reserve accumulation without 
the associated disadvantages. In particular, as pension fund foreign asset accumulation 
would be financed by domestic saving, it does not raise the issues typically associated with 
the financing of foreign reserve accumulation, such as the possible loss of monetary control 
or the carrying costs associated with sterilisation of intervention in foreign exchange markets.  
                                                  
30   On the other hand, some commentary suggests that the relationship between pension asset growth and 
market capitalisation has been weak in some countries over certain periods. Possible explanations include 
inadequate regulatory and financial infrastructure and a lack of a critical mass in pension fund assets under 
management. 
31  The conditions are that the economy be less open (ie restrictions on capital flows) and the legal system be 
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ARBR CLCOMXPE VE CZHU PL RU
AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; HK = Hong Kong SAR; HU = Hungary; 
ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; 
SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; TW = Taiwan (China); VE = Venezuela; ZA = South Africa.
1 As a percentage of GDP.    2 End-2006 figures.    3 345% for Hong Kong SAR.    4 904% for Hong Kong SAR.
Sources: IMF; Standard & Poor’s; BIS.
Broad money3  Debt securities Stock market capitalisation4 
Size of financial market1, 2
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